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Abstract
Most research on media effects in political science deals with the news media or
political campaigns. While some recent work looks at the effects of soft news on
beliefs and opinions, little attention has been paid to the potential consequences of
media that are fictional. Although viewers typically watch fiction for entertainment,
the themes, plots, and dialogue may nevertheless influence their thoughts about
politics. This paper examines the effects of fiction on political beliefs. We do this in
the context of an experimental design, where subjects in the treatment group watched
the outlandish movie, Wag the Dog. The results show that those who watched the
film were more likely to believe in a far-fetched conspiracy, namely that the U.S.
government has and will fabricate a war for political gain. The findings stretch
the boundaries of fictional influence by focusing on extreme, conspiratorial beliefs.
We suggest that political science and communications scholars should focus greater
attention on the implications of fiction for beliefs and attitudes, as the consequences
can be perverse.
1 Introduction
Today’s media environment affords citizens tremendous choice. Information can be
acquired instantaneously through the Internet, 24 hours news networks, or smart
phones. So, too, the options in entertainment media are only a mouse-click or scroll
of the finger away. This dual rise in choice and in technology has not been without
consequence. Evidence suggests that those who attend closely to the news—a rela-
tively small percentage of the public—have seen gains in their political knowledge,
thanks to the now-readily available sources of information (Prior, 2007). But for the
majority of the public, because today’s media environment offers ever more opportu-
nities to navigate away from the news, citizens are spending considerable time with
entertainment. This trend has contributed to disparities in political knowledge and
turnout (Prior, 2005, 2007).
As exposure to entertainment media rises, scholars are left with the question of
whether this exposure, in and of itself, has consequences. It may simply be that
entertainment crowds out opportunities for citizens to learn about politics. If true,
such media are fairly innocuous—in a normative sense, they neither aid nor harm
citizens. Alternatively, some research suggests that at least one segment of the
entertainment media, soft news, can increase viewers’ awareness of public affairs.1
Here citizens can be exposed to issues and ideas that they would otherwise miss, and
actually learn something about politics as a result (Baum, 2002, 2003). However,
because much of entertainment media is distorted and riddled with error, it could be
that exposure to such media leads to misinformation, if consumers believe that such
works of fiction offer insight about society and politics.
Why would one expect consumers of entertainment media to learn from it? Works
of fiction make no claims of truth, and moreover, should be expected to contain
any number of factual inaccuracies and errors. Ostensibly, viewers should perceive
fiction as merely pleasurable distraction, with the contents of such programming
inconsequential for beliefs and attitudes about politics. Yet fictional media often
1To avoid redundancy, hereafter we say “viewing” or “watching,” but this discussion applies to
both broadcast and print media.
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contain socially or politically relevant topics, themes, plots, dialogue and imagery.
People watch fiction to be entertained, but they may do so with an eye toward
accessing distant—but realistic—places, people and situations. None of us have
fought in the Civil War, and few will ever have the opportunity to investigate a
murder, captain a submarine, or treat a dying patient. But we can do all of these
things through fiction. Entertainment media can expand our horizons and introduce
us vicariously to new feelings and experiences—all without leaving our homes. While
viewers likely approach fiction mindful of its shortcomings, they also know that it
can provide lessons for real life.
We examine the effects of fictional media for political beliefs. We canvas an
emerging literature that suggests that people learn from fiction. We discuss and
subsequently explore the processes by which fiction could influence beliefs, drawing
from both dual mode theories of persuasion and the concept of perceived realism.
We then test whether information in fiction influences political beliefs through an
experimental research design. Those in the treatment group watched the movie
Wag the Dog—a satire on government, the news media, and public opinion. We
demonstrate that watching an outlandish film can make people receptive to a far-
fetched conspiracy theory, namely that it is possible for the U.S. government to
fabricate a war for political gain. Our theory and findings challenge scholars to take
fictional media seriously, as the consequences of such media for beliefs about politics
are alarming.
2 Fictional Media and Real World Beliefs
Although scholarly attention to fiction is limited in comparison to the news media or
campaigns, there are several areas of research that have pointed to the influence of
fiction. Much attention has been focused on its potentially harmful ramifications for
the young, particularly violence (see Huesmann and Taylor, 2006; Anderson, Gentile,
and Buckley, 2007 for reviews) and portrayals of sexual behavior (Eyal, Kunkel, Biely,
& Finnerty, 2007; Zhang, Miller, & Harrison, 2008; Brown et al., 2006; Chandra et al.,
2008; Collins et al., 2004). An emerging literature has shown that fiction can effect
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learning and real world beliefs for adult audiences as well. Early research explored
the consequences of exposure to the mini-series Amerika, a fictional account of life
in the United States in the aftermath of Communist control. Scholars found that
viewers had heightened concerns about the Soviet Union (Lenart & McGraw, 1989).
Feldman and Sigelman’s (1985) study of the film The Day After—which chronicled
the potential consequences of a devastating nuclear war—found that the content
affected the audiences’ levels of political knowledge, but it did not fundamentally
alter their political attitudes. More recently, Mutz and Nir (2010) randomly assigned
subjects to either a positive or negative portrayal of the criminal justice system by the
crime drama Law & Order. They found that participants’ perceptions of the justice
system and their views about the death penalty were affected by exposure to the
entertainment media, particularly among those who empathized with the characters.
Several studies have offered evidence that fiction can influence attitudes and even
perceptions of public officials. Davis and Davenport (1997) showed that African
Americans who saw the movie Malcolm X became more race-conscious and con-
cerned about race relations as a result. Similarly, experiments by Holbrook and
Hill (2004, 2005) demonstrated that dramas including Without A Trace and ER,
increased perceptions of crime and health care as important issues, respectively, and
that this media influenced respondents’ perceptions of Presidents Clinton and Bush.
Mulligan and Habel (2011) offered evidence that the way in which fiction frames is-
sues could affect political attitudes. In like manner to politicians or the news media,
fictional media also frame issues, and such framing was shown to matter for related
attitudes on abortion in the case of incest and the extent to which one follows his/her
own conscience.
Moreover, research from communications and psychology suggests that those who
consume fiction incorporate blatantly false information into their store of knowledge.
Studies demonstrate that when people are exposed to information known to be factu-
ally incorrect, the fiction nevertheless interferes with their abilities to answer related
knowledge questions (Gerrig & Prentice, 1991; Rapp, 2008). Similarly, a series of
laboratory experiments have shown that viewers, after they were exposed to fictional
narratives, confused fact with fiction (Levine, Serota, Shulman, 2010) and drew from
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fictional information when answering knowledge questions about the actual world
(Marsh, Meade, & Roediger, 2003; A. C. Butler, Zaromb, Lyle, & Henry L. Roedi-
ger, 2009). According to Marsh and Fazio (2006), “Readers rely on fiction as a source
of information, even when fiction contradicts relatively well known facts about the
world” (p. 1140).
3 Fictional Media and Conspiracy Beliefs
Given evidence that fiction could be influential, we address whether fiction could
matter for political beliefs related to a far-fetched theory about government, one
that has dire normative implications. We explore whether fictional media influences
beliefs in the possibility of the U.S. government fabricating a war for political gain.
Specifically, we test whether participants who were exposed to a fictional film with a
conspiratorial message are more likely to believe that the U.S. government can stage
a fake war. Thus our study stretches the boundaries of fictional influence, not only
by testing fiction’s consequences for political beliefs, but by examining implications
for extreme, conspiratorial ones.
Our study follows two previous works on the effects of fiction for conspiratorial
views about politicians and government. Douglas and Sutton (2008) found that ex-
posing participants to conspiratorial information about the death of Princess Diana
changed perceptions of the causes of her fatal car crash. Butler, Koopman, and
Zimbardo (1995) focused on the effect of Oliver Stone’s movie JFK for beliefs about
President Kennedy, a film which blended fact with fiction in chronicling the assas-
sination of the President. The movie implicated several institutions and politicians
in the assassination and alleged coverup, and Butler et. al. (1995) found that many
viewers bought into Oliver Stone’s conspiracy theory.
Although both of these studies are suggestive of the power of fiction to influence
conspiratorial beliefs, they are limited in at least three respects. First, conspiracy
theories have surrounded the death of Princess Diana and the Kennedy assassina-
tion for some time. In fact, conspiracies about the death of President Kennedy re-
main among the most widely held in American society (McCauley & Jacques, 1979;
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McHoskey, 1995). A second considerable limitation is the blending of both historical
and conspiratorial information in both studies. For example, in the film JFK, real
events—and even actual footage of President Kennedy’s final moments—were con-
flated with dramatic fiction. In fact, Mutz and Nir (2010) point to this fusion of fact
and fiction as a shortcoming related to a number of studies of fictional influence. The
third limiting factor, related to the Butler, Koopman and Zimbardo (1995) study,
is that the research participants were a convenience sample of those who had pur-
chased tickets to see JFK at the movie theater, meaning subjects self-selected into
the treatment group. These participants, having decided on their own to spend an
evening watching JFK, may have been more receptive to the movie’s conspiratorial
messages than people who chose not to watch this movie. Given the publicity and
controversy surrounding the film at the time it was released, some viewers likely
decided to go see it—and others avoided it—for that very reason.
3.1 Mechanisms of Influence
We argue that fiction could matter for even conspiratorial beliefs, although the pro-
cess(es) by which this could occur remains unexplored. Early studies on the effects
of fiction were grounded in cultivation theory, and recent advances suggest that for
heavy users of fiction, television reality is more accessible than the real world. Green
(2004) and Busselle and Bilandzic (2008) refer to this concept as perceived realism,
which can further be conceptualized as external and narrative realism. External
realism is the extent to which the narrative is perceived as mirroring reality, where
the setting, plot, characters, and dialogue appear quite plausible and life-like to
the viewer. Narrative realism reflects the internal coherence and logic of the story,
whether the relationships among characters, story events, and plot fit together in
reasonable ways. According to these authors, viewers of fiction are not blank slates,
but rather they have mental models of the real world (Oatley, 2002; R. W. Busselle
& Greenberg, 2000; R. Busselle, 2001; R. Busselle & Bilandzic, 2008). To the extent
that viewers incorporate the information from fiction into their cognitive structures,
they will perceive the fiction as real. Thus viewers highest in measures of the concept
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of perceived realism should be the most likely to be influenced by the fiction, even
adopting conspiratorial views about government. (M. C. Green Green, 2004; M. C.
Green, Brock, & Kaufman, 2004; R. Busselle, 2001; Slater, Rouner, & Long, 2006).
We also consider a second process: scrutiny. Dual mode theories posit that
persuasion occurs through one of two general processes or “routes,” where opinion
change depends on the motivation and ability of the individual to scrutinize the per-
suasive message (Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1995).2 Although dual mode
theories are centered on attitude change rather than belief change, these theories
nevertheless could prove useful for understanding when and how people adopt infor-
mation presented in fiction as true. According to dual mode theory, when motivation
and ability are high, people tend to evaluate messages carefully and are persuaded
(or not) based on a thoughtful consideration of the argument. When motivation or
ability are lacking, individuals do not scrutinize the message, but instead they rely
on peripheral cues or information shortcuts (For a review, see Chaiken and Trope,
1999.).3 Applied to the persuasive effects of fiction, we theorize that influence is likely
to occur through a low effort process. One reason for this is that those who evaluate
the messages in fiction carefully should recognize that fiction lacks credibility as a
source of information. And because people typically turn to fiction to be entertained
and not informed, one should expect that people do not scrutinize the messages they
receive (D. Prentice & Gerrig, 1999). Viewers may be cognitively busy following the
story (L. K. Fazio & Marsh, 2008; Marsh & Fazio, 2006), and could lack the mental
resources necessary to evaluate the information in fiction.
Several studies have addressed this hypothesis empirically. Consistent with dual
mode theory, initial research suggested that fiction is less influential when the setting
is close to home rather than in a less familiar context (D. A. Prentice, Gerrig, & Bailis,
1997). In contrast, other work has shown that fiction is just as influential when
people know the setting well as when they do not (Wheeler, Green, & Brock, 1999).
Others have failed to demonstrate that fiction works through a low effort process.
2Dual mode approaches include Petty and Cacioppo’s Elaboration Likelihood Model (1986),
Chaiken’s Heuristic–Systematic Model (1980), and Fazio’s MODE model (1990).
3These high–and low–effort processes of persuasion are not necessarily either/or, but a continuum
between the most extreme low- and high effort processes.
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Experiments by Fazio and Marsh (2008) reduced the effort necessary to examine
a fictional story by presenting it at a sixth grade reading level and slowing the
speed in which it was presented aurally. Contrary to expectations, they found that
participants in these conditions were no less likely than those in the control conditions
to adopt false facts as true. Studies have also made it easier for participants to
scrutinize fictional sources by reminding them that fiction often contains inaccuracies.
This research demonstrated that general warnings about inaccuracies do little to
diminish the effects of fiction. Mulligan and Habel (2011) failed to observe differences
in those motivated to carefully attend to the messages in fiction compared to those
who were not.
To date, the only situations in which the effects of fiction have been shown to be
diminished are when participants are told explicitly that the information they en-
counter is factually incorrect, or when subjects are required to evaluate each sentence
as true or false as they read it. Even then, the effects of fiction are not necessarily
eliminated (A. C. Butler et al., 2009; L. K. Fazio & Marsh, 2008). “Readers of fiction
are surprisingly passive,” Fazio and Marsh, (2008, p. 183) conclude, as they “appear
to passively accept information presented in stories and need a constant reminder to
monitor for errors” (p. 180).
4 Wag The Dog Experiment
To explore the implications of fiction for conspiratorial beliefs about politics, we
selected the film Wag the Dog, which centers on a farcical plot. Here the U.S.
president and his staff stage a fake war in a Hollywood studio as a means of distracting
the public’s attention from a domestic scandal. Unlike many previous studies, the
film does not blend fact with fiction. No actual historical events or persons were used
in the film. Rather, WTD offers an outlandish take on U.S. democracy, portraying
the president and his emissary as unconstrained by other actors. The characters wield
tremendous political power, far beyond what would be conceivable in a system with
the separation of powers, checks and balances, and an independent media. The film
presents politicians as corrupt, authoritarian, and manipulative—capable of doing
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whatever it takes to stay in power.
To describe the film briefly, WTD begins as the president, in the midst of his
reelection campaign, is caught in a sex scandal with a “Firefly Girl.” The presi-
dent (whose identity and party affiliation are not known) hires a political consultant
(played by Robert DeNiro) to help distract attention from the scandal. The consul-
tant accomplishes his task by staging a fake war with Albania through the aide of
a Hollywood filmmaker (played by Dustin Hoffman). Together they create footage
and hire actors (including a deranged murderer played by Woody Harrelson, who
portrays a military hero in the fake war) to fool the media and the public into think-
ing that the U.S. is at war with Albania. The plan works. The president’s scandal
falls from the agenda, and the public and news media rally around the president.
Clearly, WTD should be perceived by viewers as outlandish fiction. The notion that
the government has or will fabricate a war in a Hollywood studio should seem out-
rageous. But our theory suggests that for some viewers, watching the movie could
have perverse consequences for their beliefs about politics, that viewers could adopt
conspiratorial views—believing in the possibility of a Wag the Dog-like scheme.
To test the effects of fiction on political beliefs, in the spring of 2008, we recruited
191 participants from an introductory course in U.S. politics in exchange for course
credit.4 Although some have raised concerns over whether the findings from student
samples are generalizable to the population of U.S. adults, we believe that the use of
a student sample here is appropriate. Druckman and Kam (2011) note that student
samples present a threat to mundane realism (more so than external validity) if
“...the magnitude and direction of the treatment effect depends upon a particular
(set of) covariate(s) that are peculiarly distributed within a student sample.” We
do not expect this to be the case. Rather, given the higher levels of education
and political knowledge among our student sample when compared with the general
population, we should expect to find less evidence of fictional influence. That is,
4All subjects participated under the guise that the experiment was being conducted by “re-
searchers in the departments of Cinema/Photography and English” who “want to look at how
people think about a story when they read it in a book versus watching it on film. Participants
at [participants’ university] are watching the film version of the story. Participants at another
university are reading the book version.”
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viewing WTD should matter less for the political beliefs of our audience than for
those of the general population of U.S. adults.
The participants were randomly assigned to a treatment group, N=92, or a control
group, N=99.5 All participants, both those in the treatment and control conditions,
were presented with the following scenario before being asked about their beliefs in
the likelihood of a fake war. For those in the treatment group, these slides were
placed within a larger questionnaire that was administered after viewing the film.
For those in the control, students completed the questionnaire upon entering the
laboratory, and they then participated in a different study. Each slide appeared
separately on participants’ screens, and they were instructed to proceed to the next
slide after they finished reading the current one.
Slide 1 Consider a scenario in which an American president—any president who
has been elected in the past or may be elected in the future—faces a scandal
that causes the president’s opinion poll ratings to go down.
Slide 2 In order to increase his opinion ratings—say, during his reelection campaign,
or for some other reason—the president and his assistants work with a film
producer to stage a fake war.
Slide 3 The intention is not actually to go to war. Rather, the intention is to create
fake video scenes of a war so that the news media and citizens will think the
country is at war.
Slide 4 The video footage of the fake war is given to members of the news media,
who think they are real, and play them on television as if they were real.
5We looked to see whether there were notable differences in the distribution of relevant covariates
among treatment and control groups, including differences in race, sex, partisan identification,
ideology, and political knowledge. Chi-squared tests, presented in the online appendix, revealed
that there were no statistically significant differences across groups. We do note that 7 participants
in the treatment group had previously seen WTD. Unfortunately, we are not aware of the number
of subjects in the control group who had previously seen WTD, as this question was not included
in their questionnaire.
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Slide 5 The news media and the public think the country has gone to war. They
rally around the president during this time of trouble. The president’s opinion
poll ratings go way up.
We devised the above description carefully, so that the scenario presented to all
participants closely matched the plot of the film. Thus those who watched WTD
should immediately recognize the scenario as corresponding to movie. We expect
that their responses will be influenced by the contents of the film. Those in the
control group, however, should evaluate the information presented according to the
merits, whether or not the scenario is plausible.
Following the presentation of the five slides, all participants were asked two ques-
tions. One question read, “How likely is it that a U.S. president WILL stage a fake
war IN THE FUTURE?” with emphasis included. Subjects were offered a fully la-
beled 6-point scale ranging from extremely unlikely to extremely likely. A second
question read, “Generally speaking, how likely is it that a U.S. president HAS AC-
TUALLY STAGED a fake war in the past?” using the same six point scale, again
with emphasis as listed. Participants’ responses to these two questions subsequently
serve as the dependent variables in our analysis. According to our theory, those in
the treatment group should be more likely to believe in the likelihood of a future
faked war and a past staged war.
4.1 Dual Mode Manipulation and a Measure of Perceived
Realism
The experiment also included a manipulation designed to test the expectation that
the effects of fiction are more pronounced under a low-effort process. Participants in
the treatment group were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: low or high
motivation to scrutinize. Those in the low scrutiny condition were asked to watch the
movie as they would normally. Those in the high scrutiny group were asked to “pay
careful attention throughout the movie” because “you will be tested on what you
remember about it.” Through this fairly standard dual-mode procedure (Chaiken &
Trope, 1999), we test whether participants who have been experimentally motivated
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to scrutinize the film are less influenced by it than those in the “watch-normally”
condition.
We also included, as part of the questionnaire for those in the treatment group,
a six-item measure of perceived realism.6 These questions tap the extent to which
viewers perceived the plot, story, characters, and the movie generally, as realistic.
The scale, adapted from Green, Brock, and Kaufman (2004), and related to Busselle
and Bilandzic (2009), is linked with external realism more so than narrative realism.
In the context of WTD, evaluations of the plausibility of the story are more critical
to beliefs than viewers’ perceptions of the internal coherence and logic of the film.
Consistent with theory, we anticipate that viewers perceiving WTD as resembling
reality will be more likely to adopt conspiratorial beliefs (M. C. Green Green, 2004;
M. C. Green et al., 2004; R. Busselle & Bilandzic, 2009).
4.2 How We Addressed Potential Demand Characteristics
For this study to be internally valid, changes in dependent variables must be at-
tributed unambiguously to the manipulations. Internal validity demands that fac-
tors that could affect an outcome variable other than a treatment be constant across
treatment and control groups. Lack of constancy between groups with respect to
extraneous factors introduces the possibility of confounds. This study, like most
experiments, relies on random assignment to assume that extraneous factors are dis-
tributed evenly between treatment and control groups. However, potential violations
of constancy may occur whenever the act of participating in an experiment influences
treatment and control participants in different ways. Such demand characteristics
can occur when participants implicitly seek to carry out what they perceive as their
appropriate role as subjects in an experiment and, importantly, these interpretations
differ systematically between treatment and control groups (Orne, 1962; Rosenthal,
1966; Webber & Cook, 1972; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). In the present
context, this could have happened if treatment subjects implicitly saw their role as
one of “going along” with the farcical WTD scenario, and this implied believing that
6The six items are listed in an online appendix.
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it could happen in real life.
Although the possibility of demand characteristics cannot be completely elim-
inated, we attempted to address these and related concerns in three ways. First,
the graduate research assistant who seated participants at their workstations was
unaware of whether participants were assigned to treatment or control, and also un-
aware of the purpose of the study.7 Two, participants were deceived about the true
purpose of the study. Aronson & Carlsmith (1968) refer to deception in the context
of an experiment as “a cognitive analogy to a placebo” (p. 73), because all subjects in
both treatment and control are led to believe the study has the same (false) purpose.
To elaborate, in our study, upon entering the lab, each participant was informed in
writing that the experiment was about how people perceive a story in film versus in
text. Treatment participants were unaware that they would watching a film advocat-
ing a conspiratorial message, and moreover, that they would subsequently be asked
about the influence of the film on their political beliefs. Third, participants in both
the treatment and control groups encountered the same procedure. Entering the
lab, control group participants were assigned to a computer work station where they
answered questions relevant to this study and then watched a film for a separate,
unrelated experiment. Subjects in the treatment group began with a questionnaire
irrelevant to the present study, and then they watched WTD, which was followed by
the questionnaire related to WTD. All participants—both treatment and control—
wore headphones and watched the film on private monitors. The procedure should
have appeared functionally same for all subjects.8
7The graduate assistant randomly assigned students to a computer, which housed the experi-
ment. Thus the graduate student only knew to which workstation a participant was assigned. He
did not know if the participant was assigned to treatment or control.
8In a double-blind placebo study, neither experimenter nor participants know which subjects
are in treatment or control conditions. The present experiment is not double-blind placebo because
both the experimenter and participants could have become aware of who was watching WTD by
snooping on other subjects’ monitors.
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5 Results
Our expectations are that participants who watched WTD will be more likely than
those in the control group to believe that the president will fake a war in the future
and that he has faked a war in the past. We present our findings in two ways: first,
visually, by contrasting the distribution of responses to the two questions separately
among treatment and control groups; and second, statistically, by estimating ordered
logit models.9 Following these results, we address a potential confound—whether the
similarity of the WTD scenario to President Clinton’s bombing of Afghanistan and
Sudan late in his presidency, an event that many at the time suggested bore some
similarity to the plot of WTD (see Baum 2003 for a discussion). Then we take up
whether participants in the low-scrutiny condition were more influenced by the film,
followed by tests of perceived realism.
We now turn to the effects of watching WTD on conspiratorial beliefs. Two fig-
ures contrast the distribution on our dependent variables for treatment and control
groups. Figure 1 shows the percentage of participants in each category for the ques-
tion of whether the scenario depicted in the film is likely to happen in the future,
and Figure 2 presents the same information for whether such events have already
transpired.
[Insert Figure 1 and 2 about here]
The figures, respectively, demonstrate that participants who watched the film were
more likely to adopt the position that a future president will engage in a WTD-like
scheme, and that a past president has already done so. Each of the three “likely” re-
sponse categories has more treatment participants than control, and each “unlikely”
category has more control group participants than treatment. One should consider
that it is one thing for viewers to “learn” that a conspiracy scenario might be likely
9We also used genetic matching as a check on the robustness of our results (Sekhon & Grieve,
2011; Sekhon & Diamond, Forthcoming). Using one-to-one matching, we matched subjects by
partisan identification, ideology, race, sex, and political knowledge, and then examined the effect of
having watched WTD on our two dependent variables. The effect was statistically significant for
both models at the p ¡ .001 level.
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in the future, as we see in Figure 1. It is something else for viewers to decide that
a president of the United States has already conspired and deceived the polity into
believing that the U.S. has fabricated a war, as we find in Figure 2. This preliminary
analysis suggests that WTD did lead viewers to adopt conspiratorial views.
Ordered logit models provide a more formal test. We present the results in Table
1, where we include a single indicator for having seen the film. Because participants
were randomly assigned to treatment and control, it is not necessary to include
control variables.10 For both the future war and past war question, the coefficient on
the indicator of whether participants watched the movie is positive and statistically
significant. We confirm what we observed visually: fiction can drive perverse views
about democracy and governance.11
[Insert Table 1 about here]
5.1 WTD and Clinton’s Attacks on Terrorist Sites
We pause briefly to consider that the WTD scenario bears some similarity to an
actual event that transpired near the time of the movie’s release. On August 20,
1998, shortly after President Clinton testified before a grand jury about his relation-
ship with Monica Lewinsky, the President ordered airstrikes on suspected terrorist
sites in Afghanistan and Sudan. According to Baum (2003), in the week following
the attacks, one-sixth of the TV news stories on the missile strikes, and more than
three-fourths of soft news stories, “addressed the Wag the Dog theme, repeatedly
questioning whether the President launched the missile strikes to distract the nation
from the Lewinsky scandal.” In December of that year, Clinton ordered air strikes
against Iraq on grounds of their failure to comply with U.N. weapons inspectors.
Here again, the President was accused of distracting attention away from his domes-
tic troubles, this time from his ongoing impeachment hearings. The fact that the
10Our treatment and control subjects were balanced on observable traits, such as gender, race,
partisan identification, political knowledge, and ideology. See the online appendix for details.
11The results of additional statistical tests, including t-tests and ordered logits omitting partici-
pants who had previously seen the file, are available in an online appendix. The substantive results
from these tests are consistent with what we present here.
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media asked whether Clinton “wagged the dog” in 1998 raises the possibility that
participants in our study recalled this event. If true, this presents a confound. Did
viewers who said that the scenario is likely have this event in mind?
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
We can address this confound in two ways, one logically and one empirically.
First, because we drew participants from an undergraduate student population, it is
important to note that most of our subjects were children in the autumn of 1998,
having been born in the late 1980s or early 1990s. Their exposure to news and soft
news linking the real world events of 1998 and the movie was, presumably, very low.
Second, we included in the questionnaire for both control and treatment groups a
question related to which president had staged a war. We asked participants who
believed that it was at least “somewhat” likely that a president had staged a fake war
to identify the likely perpetrators.12 Figure 3 shows the distribution of responses to
this question. The results show that only 8 participants—5 in the WTD group and
3 in the control—attributed Clinton with having orchestrated a fake war. Rather,
both Presidents George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush were much more likely to
be implicated.
5.2 Dual Mode Manipulation
We now move to addressing the effects of motivated scrutiny and perceived realism.
As we outlined, belief change may stem from a low effort process, although alternative
research suggests that fiction may be as influential for those motivated to scrutinize
as those who are not motivated. We examined the effect of scrutiny by estimating two
additional ordered logit models, one for both the future war and past war questions.
We include the results of these models in Table 2. Both models have two explanatory
variables—one for participants who watched WTD and were in the high scrutiny
condition, and another for those who saw and the movie and were in the low scrutiny
12We offered participants a list of the four most recent presidents and an open-ended response
where they could list another president, as well as a “none” category. Subjects were able to choose
more than one president.
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group. Thus the excluded category is the control group, those who did not watch
the film.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
The results suggest that scrutiny is not the mechanism whereby fiction influences
political beliefs. For the model in the first column, we do observe a difference between
those in high motivation to scrutinize and low scrutiny groups, but in the opposite
direction from what would be expected. Here those motivated to scrutinize were
more likely to adopt conspiratorial beliefs than those in the low motivation group.
In the second model, we observe that both groups were significantly more likely to
adopt conspiratorial beliefs compared to those in the control, but these groups are
not statistically distinct from one another. Our results together indicate that the
effects of the movie on beliefs about a fake war did not occur through a low effort
process.
5.3 Perceived Realism
Another potential mechanism for influence is the extent to which the film is perceived
as reflecting reality. We examine this by estimating two additional ordered logit
models, one for each question, and including an indicator of scrutiny. Participants
who did not watch the movie, because they could not logically perceive it as real
or unreal, were excluded from this analysis.13 The results of the two ordered logit
models are displayed in Table 3.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
The results of both the future war and past war models speak to our expectations
about perceived realism. The coefficient on perceived realism is positive and statisti-
cally significant. Participants who thought the movie was highly realistic were more
13Imputing a value of 0 for the variable for all subjects in the control group, and then rerunning
the models on the entire sample, raises concerns over multicollinearity. Thus we choose to estimate
this model within treatment subjects
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likely to believe that a future president will stage a fake war and that a previous
president has already done so. This finding is intuitive; as viewers are drawn into
the fabricated story of the film, they are more likely to see its message as having
implications for the real world in which they live.
6 Discussion
The findings present rather startling evidence that fictional media matter for conspir-
atorial beliefs about politics, findings that have perverse implications for democratic
governance. Participants in the treatment group, who were assigned at random to
view the film Wag the Dog, were significantly more likely to believe that a president
will stage a fake war in the future and that an actual president has done so in the
past. We also examined two processes of fictional influence: perceived realism and
critical scrutiny. The results showed that participants who thought the movie was
realistic were more likely to be affected by its content than those who saw it as less
realistic. Our findings also showed that the movie influenced participants’ beliefs
regardless of whether or not they were motivated to scrutinize the film.
Considering that the treatment was a fictional film with wholly concocted charac-
ters and plot, the fact that we find viewers changed their beliefs cannot be overstated.
Our results suggest that scholars of political science should take fiction seriously. The
opportunities for citizens to seek out fictional entertainment media are greater than
ever—and research has shown that most people avail themselves of these opportuni-
ties, turning off the news and turning on entertainment. This paper demonstrated
that this choice of entertainment over reality could have dire normative consequences.
Citizens can learn from fiction, and when that fiction provides information that sug-
gests government can lay the foundations for a fake war to deceive the citizenry,
viewers can “learn” such antidemocratic messages.
The results also have implications for the understanding of mass media effects on
public opinion more generally. Some of the earliest media research, including Cantril
and colleagues’ (1940) classic Invasion From Mars: A Study in the Psychology of
Panic, concluded that media influence could be profound. The results from the
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present study would seem to be a throwback to this early research. Of course not all
of the participants who watched WTD believed that an actual U.S. president had
staged a fake war in a movie studio, but many did, just as many of those who heard
Mercury Theatre’s War of the Worlds radio program in 1938 thought that New
Jersey had been invaded by Martians. It could be that researchers have been looking
for media effects in the wrong place. News media may have less-than-large effects
because the news strives for factual objectivity, or because citizens filter information
through their partisanship or ideology. Entertainment fiction, however, makes no
claims of truth, is typically non-ideological, and it is watched by almost everyone.
While it would be premature to make bold claims based on this single study, the
results suggest that the effects of fiction are a potentially large, and they are a largely
untapped, reservoir of media effects.
The findings also point to the broader role of culture in influencing beliefs and
attitudes. Scholars have perceived that news and entertainment media affect how
citizens think about the world around them. Such concerns motivate the many
studies of media violence and media effects on children more generally. The findings
here challenge researchers to focus again on ways in which our popular culture,
as expressed through entertainment media, shape citizens’ views. From what we
have seen here, because fiction could matter for even far-fetched political beliefs,
it is reasonable to think that fiction, as an expression of culture, could have broad
implications for changing levels of trust in government, feelings of political efficacy,
and citizens’ cynicism or apathy about politics.
These implications notwithstanding, future work remains. First, this study did
not have a true placebo group. In our experiment, participants entered the lab and
were randomly assigned to treatment or control conditions. A true blind placebo
study would run treatment and control participants in separate rooms or separate
times to create the illusion that everyone in the study receives the same treatment.
Alternatively, one could attempt to make the movie-watching experience more “life
like,” enhancing external realism by having participants watch a film together in
small groups in a causal, livingroom environment, or even with a large group in a
movie theater. Such alternative research designs could remove confounds, or possibly
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introduce new ones.
Second, we assume that the WTD conspiracy plot drove responses to the real-
world conspiracy questions. But it is possible that factors unrelated to the conspiracy
per se, such as the dishonesty, corruption, or manipulativeness of the fictional pres-
ident in WTD may have been partially responsible for the results. In this context,
viewers could have been reacting to the negative portrayal of the president and politi-
cians moreso, or in addition to, the conspiratorial message of the film. Future work
could begin to disentangle the extent to which the conspiratorial message or the neg-
ative portrayal of politicians influenced beliefs by showing control group participants
a movie that portrays a president in a negative fashion, and yet does not advance a
conspiratorial message. Alternatively, one could conceive of editing portions of the
Wag the Dog film accordingly.
Related, the paper examined two mechanisms of fictional influence–perceived
realism and motivation to scrutinize—but these are only two of many potential pro-
cesses. We believe that our findings offer an important step towards understanding
what drives influence, although we recognize that it is difficult to test for mecha-
nisms. And perhaps the result for perceived realism is not all that surprising: those
who perceived the film as more like reality were more likely to buy into its message.
The fact of the matter is that we know relatively little about the moderators of the
effects of fiction on politically-consequential beliefs. Research on news media has
focused on content, accessibility, and subjective importance of news topics, while
work on narrative fiction has tended to deal with realism, emotional absorption, and
identification with story characters. Future research should move beyond what we
and others have accomplished to explore systematically the ways that fiction affects
political beliefs.
Third, several recent studies have addressed the decay of media effects, finding
some evidence that what appeared to be, initially, a strong effect of campaign adver-
tisements or frames could dissipate fairly rapidly (Gerber, Gimpel, Green, & Shaw,
2011; Chong & Druckman, 2010). Alternatively, because work suggests that false
evidence from fiction can displace factual knowledge (Marsh et al., 2003; Marsh &
Fazio, 2006), we might expect fiction to have longer-lasting effects. At least two
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recent studies show that fictional media can have what Hovland, Lumsdaine, and
Sheffield (1949) called a sleeper effect, where the effects of fiction on beliefs actually
increase over time (Appel & Richter, 2007), even when the information is false and
perceived realism is low (Jensen, Bernat, Wilson, & Goonewardene, 2011).
Finally, scholars might also investigate what types of films and film genres tend
to be most consequential for real world political views. We tested the effects of a far-
fetched drama, but other forms of drama and comedy, and even suspense/thrillers,
action, and romance films may have implications for perceptions, stereotypes, and
beliefs. Such an effort could expand our understanding of the effects of fiction on
political views by looking at the types of politically relevant content in fiction, their
prevalence, and effects on public opinion in the aggregate. Although this study has
examined deleterious consequences of fiction, it may also be true that where fic-
tion presents accurate information, or information that could enhance social capital,
fiction could have normatively positive consequences. Finally, researchers should ex-
plore whether and how fictional media effects differ from those of news. If the results
of this study are any indication, we should not be surprised if the effects of fiction
are shown to be strong indeed.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Distribution of Beliefs in a Future Fake War
The question asked, “How likely is it that a U.S. president WILL stage a fake war IN THE FU-
TURE?” As discussed in the text, all participants were shown 5 slides describing a hypothetical
fake war scenario. Participants randomly assigned to watch Wag the Dog (N = 92) or control group
(N = 99).
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Figure 2: Distribution of Beliefs in a Past Faked War
The question asked, “How likely is it that a U.S. president HAS ACTUALLY STAGED a fake war
in the past?” Participants were randomly assigned to watch Wag the Dog (N = 92) or to the control
group (N = 99).
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Table 1: Models of Beliefs in the Likelihood of a Future Fake War and a Past Staged
War
Future War Past War














Two-tailed significance tests. ∗ p < .05, † p < .10
Ordered logit coefficients.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 3: Actual Presidents Identified as Having Faked a War
The 64 participants who said that it is at least “somewhat” likely that a president has faked a war
(37 in Wag the Dog group and 27 in the control condition) were then asked “Which (if any) of these
presidents likely staged a fake war?” Because subjects could identify more than one president, here
our y-axis is the number of responses per president, rather than the percent of respondents. There
were 98 total responses, meaning participants identified, on average, 1.5 presidents.
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Table 2: Tests of Scrutiny
Future War Past War
High Motivation to Scrutinize WTD 0.62† 0.99*
(0.33) (0.33)














Two-tailed significance tests. ∗ p < .05, † p < .10
Ordered logit coefficients.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3: Effects of Motivation and Perceived Realism on Beliefs
Future War Past War
High Motivation to Scrutinize 0.22 0.22
(0.38) (0.38)














Two-tailed significance tests. ∗ p < .05, † p < .10
Ordered logit coefficients.
Standard errors in parentheses.
31
